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Abstract 
Institutions are commonly thought of as crucial determinants for economic development. This 
argument is also prominent in the literature regarding property rights institutions as many 
studies stress their significance for economic performance. In light of these studies, many 
international organizations have argued strongly for land rights reforms in developing 
countries as means to reduce poverty, because more secure formal land rights could provide 
incentives for farmers to undertake productivity-enhancing investments. Nonetheless, while 
some studies have found that there is a positive relationship between formal land rights 
security and agricultural productivity, other studies have not. A possible explanation to these 
divergent findings involves factor endowments, more precisely the relative abundance or 
scarcity of land. Since earlier studies overlook that factor endowments may constitute an 
explanation and tend to not attempt to place the land rights debate into a broader context of 
institutional economics, this thesis aims to make a unique contribution to the research area by 
drawing on new institutional economics, by systematically and critically reviewing earlier 
studies, and by evaluating the factor endowments explanation. The thesis concludes that the 
drawbacks of earlier studies are too many to infer any useful conclusions regarding the 
explanatory power of factor endowments. The thesis does, however, argue that a potential 
explanation regarding factor endowments at least should consider the existence of credit and 
leasing markets, as well as take into account the adequacy of utilized agricultural technologies 
in particular contexts, because these three factors could potentially constitute important 
considerations for future land rights reforms. 
 
Keywords: formal land rights security, agricultural productivity, factor endowments, 
institutions, land rights debate, institutional environment, embeddedness. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent academic work has increasingly turned its attention towards the link between 
institutions and economic development, and as has been shown, institutions have an important 
role to play (Greif, 2006; North & Thomas, 1971; North & Thomas, 1973; North, 1981; North 
& Weingast, 1989; North, 1990; North, 1992). This argument is also prominent in the 
literature regarding property rights institutions as a high number of studies have argued that 
more secure property rights are conducive to improved economic performance (Coase, 1960; 
Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Barzel, 1989; Barzel, 2000; 
Libecap, 1989; Eggertson, 1990; Pejovich, 1972; Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972; Cheung, 1970; 
De Long & Shleifer, 1993; Anderson & Hill, 1975, Anderson & Hill, 1990; Barro, 1991, 
Acemoglu et al, 2001; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Binswanger et al, 1995; de Soto, 2000; 
Knack & Keefer, 1995).  
 
In light of the above-referred studies, the formalization of land rights in developing countries 
has become a central issue since more secure formal land rights may provide farmers the 
proper incentives to undertake productivity-enhancing investments (Swynnerton, 1954; 
Johnson, 1972; Firmin-Sellers, 1996; Feder & Noronha, 1987; Feder & Feeny, 1991; Feder & 
Nishio, 1998); a reason being that farmers would be “better assured of reaping future benefits 
of their present efforts” (Platteau, 1996: 36). Organizations – including the World Bank and 
organizations belonging to the United Nations – have strongly argued for the implementation 
of land rights reforms that could increase the agricultural productivity of farmers and 
ultimately reduce poverty in developing countries (World Bank, 1989; World Bank, 1993; 
Holden et al, 2009). As a result, a multitude of developing countries have – during the last 
thirty years – implemented land rights reforms; including Indonesia, Madagascar, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Ghana, Burundi, and many other countries (SMERU, 2002; Bellemare, 2013; 
Bandiera, 2002; Atwood, 1990; Boucher et al, 2005; Boucher et al, 2006, Banerjee et al, 
2002).  
 
However, although the formalization of land rights appears to be well-grounded in the 
literature, studies have suggested that it should not be regarded as a magic bullet (Besley, 
1995; Smith, 2004). Generally have land rights reforms at best shown mixed results on 
agricultural productivity (Place, 2009; Cotula et al, 2004; Besley & Burgess 2000), and 
studies that further have investigated the relationship between formal land rights security and 
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agricultural productivity have arrived at divergent findings. For instance, Feder et al (1988) 
concluded in the case of Thailand that more secure formal land rights affect agricultural 
productivity positively, whereas Migot-Adholla et al (1991) found that no such relationship 
exists in the case of three African countries. Nevertheless, one of the explanations that 
possibly could bridge the gap between the divergent findings involves factor endowments, 
more precisely the relative abundance or scarcity of land. Many studies that have analyzed 
formal land rights implicitly assume that land is a relatively scarce factor (Brück, 2003). This 
assumption does not always hold since there are contexts in which land is relatively abundant, 
and farmers’ incentives to undertake productivity-enhancing, i.e. land-saving, investments are 
expected to be fewer under such circumstances since land can be used extensively (Boserup, 
1965: 46, 65). Thus, for land rights reforms to have a positive effect on agricultural 
productivity, the population pressure first needs to become sufficiently large in order for land 
to become a relatively scarce resource.  
 
Yet, despite Boserup’s (1965) very early hypothesis regarding the importance of factor 
endowments, studies have predominantly focused on merely testing whether more secure 
formal land rights lead to increases in agricultural productivity, thereby overlooking that 
factor endowments may constitute a crucial determinant of the relationship between the two 
factors. Moreover have studies not attempted to place the land rights debate into a broader 
context of institutional economics, partial exceptions being studies by Platteau (1996) and 
Dercon & Krishnan (2010). Due to these drawbacks of earlier studies, this thesis aims to make 
a unique contribution to the research area by drawing on new institutional economics, by 
reviewing earlier studies, as well as by putting the explanation concerning factor endowments 
to the test. The thesis, hence, attempts to answer the following research question: Can factor 
endowments explain the divergent findings concerning the relationship between formal land 
rights security and agricultural productivity? 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical background of land rights 
and factor endowments by placing these concepts into the framework of new institutional 
economics. Section 3 thereafter makes use of the theoretical framework so as to critically 
review and analyze the earlier studies that have been conducted with regards to formal land 
rights security and agricultural productivity. Section 4 then concludes the thesis with a 
summary of the thesis findings, along with recommendations for future studies and policy 
implications. Following is a list of references. 
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2. Theory: Land Rights and Factor Endowments 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of land rights institutions and factor endowments, it is 
useful to place these concepts into the general framework of institutions, more commonly 
referred to as the new institutional economics. Institutions can in general be regarded as “the 
rules of the game in a society; more formally they are the humanly devised constraints” that 
“structure incentives in exchange, whether political, social, or economic” (North, 1992: 477). 
Subsequently, “[i]nstitutions provide the framework within which human beings interact”, 
constraining “people’s choice sets” (North, 1981: 201). Furthermore can institutions take 
many forms; they can for instance be divided into formal and informal institutions (North, 
1990: 4). For this reason, it is helpful to classify institutions into broader categories. Such a 
classification is provided by Williamson (1994, 2000) who developed a multi-level model of 
economic systems. This model is presented in Figure 1, and as shown, institutions are
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arranged in accordance to their respective frequencies, i.e. how much time they require to 
change. The first level involves institutions that are embedded in a society, also being the 
institutions that take the longest time to change. These institutions include informal 
institutions such as norms, customs, traditions and religion. The second and third levels entail 
the institutional environment and governance respectively, where the former comprise formal 
institutions governing property rights, while the latter mainly concerns contracts. The fourth 
level of institutions is constituted by resource allocation and employment, where the main 
factors involved can be regarded as neo-classical since prices and quantities are of essence. 
The institutions on this level are also the ones that require the shortest amount of time to 
change. 
 
At first glance, it may appear as if an analysis of land rights solely would involve the 
institutional environment as it is this level of an economic system that concerns property 
rights. Still, when also taking factor endowments into account, the embeddedness of 
institutions also becomes an important level to consider since informal institutions tend to 
govern property rights when land is a relatively abundant resource (Boserup, 1965: 63). 
Consequently should an analysis concerning land rights and factor endowments involve both 
the institutional environment and the embeddedness of institutions. With regards to the 
institutional environment, one type of theory is of main importance, namely property rights 
theory. As Demsetz (1967: 347) has highlighted, “[p]roperty rights are an instrument of 
society and derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form those 
expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealing with others.” According to this 
view, the main goal of property rights is to internalize externalities, i.e. to lower potential 
transaction costs arising from social interdependencies. By these means, property rights fill an 
important function since they affect “the allocation and use of resources in specific and 
predictable ways” (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972: 1139). Furthermore, “[p]roperty rights consist 
of a bundle of rights” (North, 1992: 478), and this bundle can be decomposed into at least five 
types of rights, namely (Barzel, 1989; Libecap, 1989; Eggertson, 1990): 
 
 Using rights (usus) 
 Alteration rights (abusus) 
 Profit rights (usufructus) 
 Selling rights  
 Exclusion rights 
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As to the security of land rights – where security here is defined as when rights provide a high 
autonomy for farmers and are properly enforced – productivity-enhancing investments, and 
hence agricultural productivity, are expected to increase when land rights become more secure 
along the five above-mentioned dimensions. The rights to use and to physically transform 
land can be considered as necessary in order for a farmer to undertake productivity-enhancing 
investments since a farmer otherwise would not have the right, nor the incentive, to cultivate 
the land. Additionally, the right to earn an income from the land without interference from 
other parties – inter alia expropriation by the government – spurs farmers’ incentives since 
farmers thereby are more able to reap the fruit of their efforts. Along these incentive 
increasing effects – or the so-called investment-demand effects – selling rights further tend to 
widen the scope for productivity-enhancing investments because more secure selling rights 
tend to enable land transfers and/or leasing from less to more productive farmers, i.e. there is 
a transactions effect (Platteau, 1996). Moreover, as the security of land rights increases, 
another effect comes into play, namely the credit-supply effect (Binswanger & Deininger, 
1999). When land rights are more secure – especially selling rights – land can to a greater 
extent be used as collateral when applying for credit (Hicks, 1969). One reason is that land, in 
comparison to other resources, can be regarded as an immobile resource that to a considerable 
degree is immune to damage, making land a desirable type of collateral (Binswanger & 
Rosenzweig, 1986). Another reason is that as more secure land rights reduce the uncertainty 
associated with the ownership of land and accordingly ascertain that land is a legitimate 
collateral (Feder & Feeny, 1991; Feder & Nishio, 1998), “lenders will ... be induced to extend 
more credit to agriculture” (Platteau, 1996: 37). 
 
Nevertheless, for the three above-mentioned effects to be realized, the five dimensions of land 
rights need to be properly enforced. In the matter of enforcement, it is convenient to 
distinguish between private and communal forms of property rights to land. Making this 
distinction, it could be argued that private rights to land are more likely to be efficient than 
communal rights because the latter do not include the right to exclude others from using the 
land (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Cheung, 1970). Non-exclusivity in the rights to a resource 
implies that there is no way of excluding others from using it, except “by prior and continuing 
use of the resource” (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973: 19). Thus, as “negotiation costs are too high 
for all [farmers] to agree jointly on optimal behavior” (Demsetz, 1967: 356), and since the 
incentive of each farmer thereby will be to overcrop in order to maximize the income 
generated from the land, the tragedy of the commons will ensue (Hardin, 1968), i.e. the land 
 10|38 
 
will become overexploited. Transaction costs can thereby be regarded as very high in the case 
of communal rights to land because such rights do not sufficiently enforce the income rights 
pertaining to a certain farmer, hence inducing farmers to not conserve their land. In other 
words, communal land rights cannot sufficiently internalize externalities. For this reason, 
private rights to land may be a better option. Private rights recognize farmers’ rights to 
exclude others from using their land (Demsetz, 1967). As farmers thereby can expect that the 
incomes generated by their land, as well as the costs, will accrue to them and not to outsiders, 
each farmer will have an incentive to use his or her land efficiently. Private rights to land are 
thereby better at internalizing externalities than communal rights, implying that the 
agricultural productivity also would be higher for farmers with private rather than communal 
rights. 
 
Still, the theoretical arguments highlighted above make two critical assumptions. One of these 
assumptions is that land is a relatively scarce resource. This assumption can be criticized on 
the ground that “[f]actor endowments may influence the directions in which institutions 
evolve” (Engerman & Sokoloff, 1994: 18). Institutions often evolve in order to capitalize on 
relatively scarce resources, because such resources tend to be characterized by a high 
marginal productivity, i.e. an augmentation of the input of such a resource is likely to 
significantly increase the output. As has been the case historically, labor rather than land has 
been the relatively scarce resource; something which in certain contexts has been denoted as 
Nieboer conditions (Austin, 2005: 155; Austin, 2009). Property rights in people, more 
commonly referred to as slavery, therefore developed so as to reap the benefits of the high 
marginal productivity of labor (Engerman & Sokoloff, 1994; Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002). 
Although these arguments pertain to relative labor scarcity, resembling arguments could be 
made when theorizing about factor endowments in terms of relative scarcity or abundance of 
land, as has been done by for instance Boserup (1965) and Binswanger & McIntire (1987). 
When land is relatively abundant, few incentives for productivity-enhancing, i.e. land-saving, 
investments could be expected since land can be used extensively (Boserup, 1965: 46, 65). 
There is thereby no competition for the land, and relying on fallow systems under communal 
rights to land may hence be regarded as efficient since land is sufficiently abundant to avoid 
overcropping (ibid: 70). However, as land becomes more relatively scarce due to population 
pressure, the competition for land is hypothesized to increase since the marginal productivity 
of land has increased. Consequently does the pressure for intensifying agriculture become 
larger, and the demand for land-saving technologies does in tandem increase (Boserup, 1965: 
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6, 46; Hayami & Ruttan, 1971; Binswanger & Ruttan, 1978). Still, for farmers to have 
incentives to undertake productivity-enhancing investments, the five types rights referred to 
above, as well as their enforcement, need to be granted to a farmer, whereby it is likely that 
farmers in conjunction with population pressure will demand a formalization of land rights 
(Boserup, 1965: 76). As factor endowments thereby can help to explain the evolution of 
institutions, it could be argued that private rights to land are unlikely to be efficient under land 
abundance; the reason being that farmers’ incentives to undertake productivity-enhancing 
investments are few because land can be used extensively. Agricultural productivity is hence 
unlikely to alter when private rights to land are introduced to or strengthened in contexts 
where land is relatively abundant. 
 
The other critical assumption is that farmers’ preferences concerning private rights to 
property, or in this case land, are assumed to be in favor of private ownership. This 
assumption does not necessarily need to hold, in turn calling for that also the embeddedness 
of institutions need to be taken into consideration. According to Granovetter (1985), 
individuals in a society do not act in isolation from the informal institutions – i.e. the norms, 
customs, and traditions – characterizing that society. This argument becomes especially 
important for societies where land is relatively abundant since communal rights tend to 
govern land use, wherein these rights are determined by informal institutions (Boserup, 1965: 
63). Moreover, Boserup (1965: 57) states that in relatively land abundant contexts, “[i]t is 
undeniable that many people hesitate to change accustomed [cultivation] methods ... and 
[that] it is possible that this attitude is more widespread in primitive communities than in more 
advanced.” The implication of this statement is that there would be a mismatch between 
informal and formal institutions if private rights to land were to be introduced to or 
strengthened in contexts where land is relatively abundant. Hence, as institutions require a 
goodness of fit to produce efficient outcomes, private rights to land are not expected to 
perform better than communal rights since the latter rights are more consistent with the 
customs – and thereby preferences – in land abundant communities. There are several 
additional reasons to why this assertion may hold true. Land provides a social safety net to 
farmers when rights to land are communal. Privatizing – i.e. formalizing – land rights under 
such circumstances might be detrimental to a community since the newly formalized rights 
may not adequately reflect the patterns of ownership that existed within that community prior 
to the formalization. Additionally, Platteau (1996) has highlighted that elites – typically being 
less productive than the farmers since elites tend to accumulate land solely for speculative 
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purposes – may try to manipulate the formalization process to their advantage. Land disputes 
and social unrest are therefore likely to emerge owing to the information asymmetries created 
by the formalization (Atwood, 1990; Deininger & Feder, 1998), implying that a formalization 
of land rights might lead to an externalization rather than an internalization of externalities. 
Furthermore, the enforcement of communal land rights in a land abundant context can be 
regarded as an uncomplicated issue. As transactions tend to be performed within the 
community, outsiders are easily detected (Feder & Feeny, 1991). There is thus no problem of 
excluding outsiders from using the community’s plot of land since it lies in the interest of the 
whole community to jointly exclude outsiders from using it. Due to these reasons, private 
rights to land are not only unlikely to be as efficient as communal rights to land when land is 
relatively abundant, but private rights may also lead to problems that cause more inefficiency, 
whereby agricultural productivity not is expected to increase due to more secure formal land 
rights. 
 
Summarizing the arguments above, it should be clear for the reader that both the 
embeddedness of institutions and the institutional environment should be taken into 
consideration when theorizing about land rights and factor endowments. When land is a 
relatively scarce resource, private rights to land are more likely to be efficient. Due to 
farmers’ incentives to conserve their land, and owing to the reasonable expectations that 
farmers can form about the incomes that will be generated by the land, farmers will be more 
prone to undertake productivity-enhancing investments, in turn increasing the agricultural 
productivity. However, when land is relatively abundant, communal land rights are expected 
to perform as well as private rights, or even better. Since the population pressure is low in 
contexts where land is relatively abundant, there are fewer incentives to use land intensively 
because agricultural output can instead be increased by dint of extensification. Additionally, 
as informal institutions tend to govern land rights in contexts where land is relatively 
abundant, there would not be a goodness of fit between the informal and the formal 
institutions if land were to be privatized as the custom stipulates communal ownership. 
Productivity-enhancing investments, and thereby also agricultural productivity, are by these 
means not expected to increase when private rights to land are introduced to or strengthened 
in a context where land is relatively abundant. In sum, the hypothesis to be empirically 
evaluated is thus that more secure formal land rights are conducive to increased agricultural 
productivity when land is relatively scarce, whereas this positive relationship cannot be said 
to hold in a context where land is relatively abundant. 
 13|38 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
Empirically evaluating the hypothesis stated in the preceding section requires a review of 
quantitative studies that have investigated the relationship between formal land rights security 
and agricultural productivity, as well as a measure accounting for factor endowments. 
Concerning the review of quantitative studies, Table 1 presents 24 studies that have analyzed 
the above-stated relationship in 26 cases; more specifically in 20 countries since some 
countries appear in more than one study, albeit in different time periods. What needs to be 
stressed, however, is that these studies have chosen to address the relationship in different 
ways, whereby the studies can be divided into three groups. The first group of studies solely 
focuses on the effects of more secure formal land rights on productivity-enhancing 
investments, including a high number of investment types, inter alia in fertilizer, irrigation, 
soil and water conservation, and draft animal services. The second group skips the 
investments and jumps right away to assess the effect on agricultural productivity. The third 
group includes both the effect on productivity-enhancing investments as well as the effect on 
agricultural productivity. Since all studies thereby directly or indirectly assess the effect of 
formal land rights security on agricultural productivity, Table 1 makes no difference between 
these types of studies.  
 
With regards to factor endowments, a measure needs to be designed so as to consider 
situations in which land is relatively abundant or scarce. A solution to such a measurement is 
to use the population density as a measure since it captures the relative abundance or scarcity 
of land in relation to the population. Using this measure, a country is relatively land abundant 
when the population density is low, whereas a country can be regarded as relatively land 
scarce when the population density is high. Yet, a proper measure of population density in this 
case needs not to take an entire country into consideration due to two reasons. Firstly, it 
cannot be assumed that the whole land area in a country is relevant to agriculture since at least 
some land is devoted to other income-generating activities. A second issue, which is related to 
the first, is that the population also may be involved in other activities than agriculture. For 
these two reasons, a measure of population density should pertain to agriculture, i.e. a 
measure of the so-called agricultural population density is needed. As a measure of the 
population density typically divides the population by land, and since a measure of the 
agricultural population density is not readily available, a measure has to be constructed using 
data on the two individual components of the measure. Such data can be found at
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Table 1. Studies Linking Formal Land Rights to Agricultural Productivity 
Author(s) Country Sample Year(s) Positive Relationship? Agricultural Population Density 
Foltz (2004) Tunisia 1995 No 0.47 
Deininger & Chamorro (2004) Nicaragua 1990-1999 Yes 0.69 
Carter & Olinto (2003) Paraguay 1991-1994 Yes 0.75 
Alston et al (1996) Brazil 1980-1985 Yes 0.79 
Johnson (1998) Mexico 1995 No 0.90 
Feder et al (1988) Thailand 1984-1985 Yes 1.61 
Twerefou et al (2011) Ghana 2005 No 1.75 
Zikhali (2008) Zimbabwe 2007 Yes 1.75 
Dlamini & Masuku (2011) Swaziland 2008 Yes 1.80 
Migot-Adholla et al (1991) Ghana 1987-1988 No 2.03 
Moor & Nieuwoudt (1998) Zimbabwe 1995 Yes 2.40 
Smith (2004) Zambia 2001 Yes 2.60 
Pender et al (2006) Uganda 1999-2001 No 3.00 
Pender & Kerr (1999) India 1993 No 3.08 
Carter et al (1989) Kenya 1985-1986 No 3.19 
Migot-Adholla et al (1991) Kenya 1987-1988 No 3.29 
Bellemare (2013) Madagascar 2002 No 3.40 
Hagos (2012) Mozambique 2008 Yes 3.42 
Jacoby & Minten (2005) Madagascar 2005 No 3.61 
Roth et al (1994) Somalia 1987-1989 No 4.67 
Holden et al (2009) Ethiopia 1998-2006 Yes 4.88 
Deininger & Jin (2006) Ethiopia 1999-2001 Yes 4.94 
Migot-Adholla et al (1991) Rwanda 1987-1988 No 5.48 
van den Broeck et al (2007) Vietnam 2006 Yes 5.78 
Li et al (2000) China 1995 Yes 6.48 
Do & Iyer (2008) Vietnam 1992-1998 No 7.36 
Sources: The above-referred studies, and FAO (2013). 
Notes: The unit of measurement in the agricultural population density measure is the population per hectare.  
1
4
|3
8
. 
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the homepage of FAO (2013). With regards to the population, two measures can be regarded 
as main candidates, namely the rural population and the agricultural population. The first of 
these measures includes the whole population in rural areas, encompassing people involved in 
all income-generating activities in such areas, including agriculture, small businesses and 
rural industries. The second measure refers to people involved in agriculture, hunting, fishing 
and forestry. Although that the second measure also comprises people being involved in 
hunting, fishing, and forestry, the second measure can be regarded as superior as it to a greater 
extent refer to the population that potentially could be involved in agriculture. The thesis 
therefore chooses the agricultural population as the population measure when calculating the 
agricultural population density. Concerning land, the best measure would be to use the 
amount of cultivable land. Such data is, however, not available. The thesis does, nonetheless, 
arrive at two candidates for measuring cultivable land, namely the amount of land devoted to 
permanent and temporary crops, as well as the arable land plus permanent crops. While the 
first of these measures captures only the amount of land that is cultivated, the second measure 
also includes temporary meadows for mowing and pastures, and land temporarily in fallow. 
However, although that the first measure thus may be regarded as more appropriate than the 
second measure, a drawback is that data for the first measure only is available from the year 
2001 and onwards, whereas data for the second measure is available from the year 1981 and 
onwards. Using the first measure for the amount of cultivable land would thereby result in 
that only eight out of 26 cases could be included in the analysis, rendering the analysis 
difficult to perform as there are very few cases available for arriving at useful conclusions. 
The thesis therefore chooses the second measure, in turn buying more cases at the expense of 
using a less accurate measure for the amount of cultivable land. In short, the thesis calculates 
the agricultural population density as the agricultural population, divided by the arable land 
plus the land devoted to permanent crops, where the findings from studies using data from 
1981 and onwards are included. 
 
Table 1 presents the figures from the agricultural population density calculations in each of 
the cases, and as shown, the expectation regarding factor endowments as an explanation does 
not seem to hold. The thesis earlier hypothesized that factor endowments would be able to 
explain why studies have arrived at divergent findings. It was expected that relatively land 
abundant communities would exhibit no positive relationship between the security of formal 
land rights and agricultural productivity, while relatively land scarce communities would 
exhibit such a relationship. Thus, using the agricultural population density as a proxy for 
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factor endowments, the relationship was expected to be positive at high densities and to not be 
positive at low densities. Contrary to expectations, nonetheless, Table 1 disconfirms factor 
endowments as an explanation.  
 
However, it must be noted that the brief analysis conducted above can be considered as naïve 
since it masks a vast array of important issues that severely distort the analysis. The first of 
these issues entails the representativeness of the samples used in each study. Some of the 
studies in Table 1 have used nationally representative samples (Deininger & Chamorro, 2004; 
Hagos, 2012; Twerefou et al, 2011), whereas the other studies have not. So as to clarify this 
issue by utilizing examples, the lack of representativeness in the latter group of studies can be 
argued to exist in three dimensions, namely in terms of geography, in terms of the number of 
households included in the sample, as well as in terms of crops. Concerning geography, 
several studies have, as Deininger & Jin (2006: 1250) point out, analyzed “limited 
geographical domains.” Carter et al (1989: 1) use a “dataset from Kenya's highly 
commercialized Njoro area.” Foltz (2004) analyzes only the Cap Bon region of Tunisia. 
Johnson (1998) uses data collected from the states of Chiapas and Sonora in Mexico. Moor & 
Nieuwoudt (1998) evaluate land rights in the Manicaland Province of Zimbabwe. With 
regards to the number of households included in studies’ samples, the most eye-catching 
example is the study undertaken by Dlamini & Masuku (2011) in the case of Swaziland that 
utilizes a survey of 63 households, which can be regarded as a relatively small number as 
Twerefou et al (2011) in the case of Ghana use data generated from 2690 households. Lastly, 
studies have tended to focus on a limited range of crops. Dlamini & Masuku (2011) focus 
solely on maize production. The study by van den Broeck et al (2007) merely considers rice 
production in Vietnam. Likewise is the case in Bellemare’s (2013) study of Madagascar, but 
this study clearly highlights the importance of rice by arguing that it is a staple crop. In short 
have studies had a limited national representativeness of their samples, in turn complicating 
the analysis conducted above. 
 
Yet, the approach to not consider a whole country when analyzing land rights is very likely to 
be more adequate. Recent studies have emphasized the existence of within-country variation 
concerning the effects of more secure formal land rights (Dercon & Ayalew, 2007; Dercon & 
Krishnan, 2010; Pande & Udry, 2006; Goldstein & Udry, 2008). A notable study by Besley 
(1995) that analyzes data from Ghana can be used to support this argument. Besley (1995) 
analyzes data from two Ghanaian regions, namely Wassa and Anloga, and reached the 
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conclusion that more secure formal land rights in Wassa were conducive to productivity-
enhancing investments, while this relationship did not hold in Anloga. This finding clearly 
demonstrates that the effect of more secure formal land rights cannot be expected to be 
uniform within a country. Instead, a change in the security of formal land rights is expected to 
display heterogenous effects in terms of productivity-enhancing investments, and thereby 
agricultural productivity. Hence, on the basis of these arguments, the naïve analysis that was 
conducted above can be rejected altogether since analyzing land rights on a country-level fails 
to capture the within-country variation with regards to the effects of more secure formal land 
rights. Put differently, micro approaches should be strictly preferred to macro approaches. 
Nevertheless, micro approaches must choose samples that include sufficient variation in the 
security of formal land rights between households, or else the parameter estimates would be 
downward biased (Deaton, 1997). 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned issue regarding samples, there are still a high number of 
other important issues that further obstruct the comparability of the studies in Table 1. A 
second issue pertains to a methodological problem that can be considered as rather technical, 
so-called endogeneity. In technical terms, endogeneity implies that the correlation between 
the error term and an independent – i.e. an explanatory – variable is different from zero. There 
are various sources of endogeneity; it may for instance occur because influential variables 
have been omitted from the estimation procedure, and/or due to measurement errors, e.g. 
because of misreported data. In case of the former, parameter estimates are biased upwards, 
whereas parameter estimates are biased downwards in case of the latter. An additional source 
of endogeneity concerns another technical term, so-called simultaneity. Simultaneity means 
that the causality between the independent and the dependent variable runs in both directions. 
In this case, it implies that the security of formal land rights may not only have an effect on 
productivity-enhancing investments, but at the same time, productivity-enhancing investments 
might have an effect on the security of formal land rights. As noted in several studies, farmers 
may undertake productivity-enhancing investments so as to improve the security of land 
rights (Baland et al, 1999; Brasselle et al, 2002; Besley, 1995; Sjaastad & Bromley, 1997; 
Platteau, 1996; Gray & Kevane, 2001; Place & Otsuka, 2001; Bruce, 1988; Holden & 
Yohannes, 2002). Thus, since both of the causal relationships in this context can be 
hypothesized to be positive, it is likely that simultaneity would lead to upward biased 
parameter estimates. Furthermore, a last source of endogeneity concerns that there may be a 
positive correlation between the security of formal land rights and agricultural productivity, 
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but not a relationship between them. Often, a proof of land ownership involves that a farmer 
possesses a title, i.e. a certificate to land, which in turn should grant a farmer his or her formal 
rights to a plot of land (Feder & Noronha, 1987; Brasselle et al, 2002; de Laiglesia, 2004). In 
reference to titles, Brasselle et al (2002: 374) highlight that when “title acquisition and title 
maintenance involve real expenditures, it is a priori possible that farmers tend to register land 
parcels that benefit from comparatively high levels of investment, or that registered farms are 
those which have better profitability conditions justifying such expenditures.” This argument 
gains further support by Moor & Nieuwoudt (1998: 611) who argue that “[t]he decision to 
register land title ... or to update existing titles, requires purposeful choices by the farmers 
themselves.” In light of the arguments in these two studies, it is probable that parameter 
estimates will be upward biased when using whether a farmer has a title as a proxy for formal 
land rights security since the estimates only will reflect a positive correlation and not a 
positive relationship. Thus, summarizing all the arguments above concerning the sources of 
endogeneity, endogeneity is likely to lead to biased parameter estimates, whereby studies 
could be led to draw the conclusion that more secure formal land rights have a positive effect 
on agricultural productivity despite that the relationship in fact does not hold, and vice versa. 
 
There are mainly three ways in which endogeneity can be addressed, namely by using 
instrumental variables regressions, by carefully choosing an appropriate sample, and/or by 
using regressions adjusting for unobservable fixed effects. With regards to instrumental 
variables, other variables can be added to the estimation procedure so as to reduce the 
biasedness of the parameter estimates. These instrumental variables should preferably be 
highly correlated with the independent variable of interest, and not be correlated with the error 
term. Despite the importance of this issue, however, not all studies in Table 1 have chosen to 
make use of this procedure. For instance, Alston et al (1996), Carter et al (1989), and Roth et 
al (1994) only make use of ordinary least squares, which can be regarded as a rather simple 
estimation technique. Smith (2004) and Pender & Kerr (1999) employ a Tobit regression, 
which is a more advanced technique that in spite of being more advanced fails to adjust the 
parameter estimates for potential biasedness. Nonetheless, quite a few of the studies in Table 
1 have attempted to address this issue by using instrumental variables. In terms of estimation 
techniques, Foltz (2004) and Carter & Olinto (2003) employ the most advanced technique by 
utilizing a so-called endogenous switching regression; a type of estimation procedure that 
builds on the standard framework of maximum likelihood estimators by also accounting for 
endogeneity. A simpler technique involves the usage of two-stage least squares estimators 
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where the estimation procedure is divided into two stages. Firstly, the variable of interest is 
regressed upon the instrumental variables to generate predicted values of the variable of 
interest. Thereafter, the dependent variable is regressed upon the predicted values. This 
estimation technique have for instance been employed in the studies by Moor & Nieuwoudt 
(1998), Li et al (2000), and Zikhali (2008) by using two-stage least squares, as well as by 
Twerefou et al (2011) that make use of the two-stage conditional maximum likelihood 
estimator. An alternative, and possibly simpler, approach would be to directly use the 
instrumental variables as control variables in the estimation procedure, which has been done 
by for example Deininger & Jin (2006), Feder et al (1988), and Bellemare (2013). Yet, 
finding suitable instrumental variables is not an easy task. Nor is the detection of endogeneity. 
Studies have, nevertheless, put forward solutions to both of these problems. Concerning the 
detection of endogeneity, Pender et al (2006) note that Hausman tests can be performed in 
order to test between an instrumental variable estimator and ordinary least squares. Moreover, 
Brück (2003) highlight some useful diagnostic tests, including the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
and the Davidson-MacKinnon test for over-identification; both tests being very useful as a 
researcher thereby can be more certain about whether an instrumental variables approach 
needs to be employed. In reference to finding suitable instrumental variables, predominantly 
two studies excel. Feder et al (1988) use instrumental variables that take into account the land 
quality, inter alia the type of soil, the length of travel time to the nearest market, whether there 
is access to irrigation, and whether a household’s land is located on a slope. Bellemare (2013) 
provide an additional set of suitable variables that can be used as instruments, more 
specifically precise soil quality measurements, including the percentages of carbon, 
potassium, nitrogen, and clay in the soil, as well as factors such as soil pH and soil color. Still, 
collecting data on each of these factors can be both time-consuming and costly. A reason that 
instrumental variables need to be used is that the researcher might have chosen a sample 
where many of the factors highlighted by Feder et al (1988) and Bellemare (2013) vary across 
households. Hence, in technical terms, the sample is characterized by heterogeneity. A 
researcher may therefore in lieu desire to choose a more homogenous sample in order to 
minimize the amount of instrumental variables that need to be included for the elimination of 
endogeneity (Pande & Udry, 2006; Goldstein & Udry, 2008). The argument above concerning 
the preference for micro approaches in analyses of land rights institutions therefore also 
deserves merit since the probability of encountering endogeneity in a sample subsequently is 
reduced. The alternative, as highlighted above, would be to make use of regressions adjusting 
for unobservable fixed effects; the reason being that such regressions eliminate the variation 
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stemming from time-invariant variables, i.e. factors that tend to change very slightly or 
nothing over time. This way of addressing the issue pertaining to endogeneity does require the 
collection of panel data rather than cross-sectional data, which may be time-consuming. 
Nonetheless, the advantage is that many of the factors that otherwise would have deemed 
necessary the usage of instrumental variables thereby can be disregarded. For this reason, 
such regressions have been employed in a few studies, for instance by van den Broeck et al 
(2007) that use the fixed effects estimator, by Jacoby & Minten (2005) that utilize a fixed 
effects version of the linear probability model, and by Do & Iyer (2008) that make use of the 
differences-in-differences estimator. In sum should the usage of all the three procedures – i.e. 
to use instrumental variables, by carefully choosing an appropriate sample, and/or by using 
regressions adjusting for unobservable fixed effects – lead a researcher to produce less biased 
parameter estimates, therefore enabling the researcher to draw more sound conclusions 
regarding the effect of formal land rights security on agricultural productivity. 
 
The third issue involves the mechanisms through which productivity-enhancing investments 
may increase. The theory part of this thesis highlighted that more secure formal land rights 
have the possibility of increasing agricultural productivity by dint of three effects, namely the 
investment-demand, the transactions, and the credit-supply effects. The first of these effects is 
induced by an increase in farmers’ incentives to invest due to more secure formal land rights, 
the second effect generally enables land transfer and/or leasing from less to more productive 
farmers, while more secure formal land rights in case of the third effect implies that more 
credit becomes available to farmers since land becomes a more legitimate collateral. As has 
been argued in a few studies, it might be important to disentangle the investment-demand, 
transactions, and credit-supply effects (Besley, 1995; Feder et al, 1988; Carter et al, 1989; 
Pender & Kerr, 1999; Carter & Olinto, 2003). A reason is that in some contexts, where 
farmers may be inclined to demand more productivity-enhancing investments as a result of 
more secure formal land rights, credit may not be readily available (Guirkinger & Boucher, 
2007). Therefore, when farmers do not dispose of the required capital to undertake 
productivity-enhancing investments by themselves, such investments do not necessarily 
increase as a result of more secure formal land rights owing to that farmers are unable to make 
loans to realize their investments. Additionally, leasing markets may function imperfectly 
which implies that allocative efficiency is inhibited, i.e. the transactions effect may not be 
realized since farmers to a great extent are unable to lease and/or lease out land plots (Pender 
& Kerr, 1999). Due to these issues, the implication is that studies that do not separate the 
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three mechanisms may reject that more secure formal land rights have a positive effect on 
agricultural productivity, even though farmers in fact have an incentive to invest more. 
However, only four of the studies in Table 1 have addressed this issue. Pender & Kerr (1999) 
explicitly test whether more secure formal land rights affect productivity-enhancing 
investments positively through all three of the mechanisms. Carter & Olinto (2003) evaluate 
the credit-supply and investment-demand effects, Foltz (2004) focuses only on the credit-
supply effect, whereas Roth et al (1994) delimit their study to the investment-demand effect.  
 
Still, all of the three mechanisms through which productivity-enhancing investments increase 
should, as in the study by Pender & Kerr (1999), be taken into consideration in order to draw 
useful conclusions. It might be the case that an implementation of more secure formal land 
rights would be adequate in a certain context due to that land has become sufficiently scarce. 
If farmers then are credit-constrained, i.e. credit is to a considerable degree unavailable, and if 
leasing markets are imperfect, land rights formalization would then also have to be 
accompanied by a creation or stimulation of credit and leasing markets. Hence, by addressing 
the issue concerning the three mechanisms through which productivity-enhancing investments 
occur, studies could provide more useful insights regarding the appropriateness as well as the 
nature of land rights reforms.  
 
The fourth issue entails how studies have chosen to address the relationship between the 
security of formal land rights and agricultural productivity. As emphasized above, studies can 
be divided into three groups; the first group focuses only on the effects on productivity-
enhancing investments, the second group skips the investments and jumps directly to the 
effects on agricultural productivity, and the third groups addresses the effects on both 
productivity-enhancing investments and agricultural productivity. In particular one study 
provides a compelling argument for why the third group of studies is superior to the rest. 
Smith (2004: 1641) contends that despite that increased land rights security “associates with 
increased fixed investments, the latter do not generally cause increased [agricultural] 
productivity in turn.” Since Smith’s (2004) definition of fixed investments encompasses 
investments that typically can be regarded as productivity-enhancing, such as manure and 
crop rotation schemes, the study provides a fair warning of why studies should seek to 
investigate the effects of more secure formal land rights on both productivity-enhancing 
investments and agricultural productivity. Yet, only six of the studies in Table 1 have taken 
into account the effects on both of the afore-mentioned factors (Smith, 2004; Moor & 
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Nieuwoudt, 1998; Holden et al, 2009; Li et al, 2000; Feder et al, 1988; Jacoby & Minten, 
2005). Thus, since the studies that constitute the first group disregard the importance of also 
analyzing the effect on agricultural productivity – also constituting the biggest group of 
studies (Deininger & Chamorro, 2004; Deininger & Jin, 2006; Alston et al, 1996; Carter & 
Olinto, 2003; Pender et al, 2006; Pender & Kerr, 1999; Johnson, 1998; Twerefou et al, 2011; 
Hagos, 2012; Foltz, 2004; Roth et al, 1994) – the same group of studies hamper the 
comparability between the studies in Table 1. Studies should therefore seek to account for the 
effects on both productivity-enhancing investments and agricultural productivity in order to a 
greater extent convince the reader about whether the relationship running from more secure 
formal land rights to agricultural productivity holds. 
 
A fifth issue concerns how different investment types have been accounted for in each study. 
Studies have included a wide range of productivity-enhancing investment types, and as the 
arguments in theory part of this thesis predicted, all types of productivity-enhancing 
investments may increase as a result of more secure formal land rights in a land scarce 
context. The issue, however, is that some studies have paid little attention to disentangle the 
effects of more secure formal land rights on particular types of productivity-enhancing 
investments. A useful example to illustrate the issue is the study by Hagos (2012) that 
analyzes the effects of formal land rights on soil conservation as well as water conservation. 
The study does, nonetheless, not distinguish between investment types in the estimation 
procedure but merely lumps together the investments into one measure. A resembling 
example can be found in Foltz (2004: 237) where investments in new technologies, manure, 
and irrigation are collected under one single term, namely “farm investments.” Hence, since 
the dependent variable in both of these cases is constituted by multiple types of productivity-
enhancing investments when undertaking regressions, the impact of more secure formal land 
rights – which then is the independent variable of interest – on particular types of 
productivity-enhancing investments is obscured. It might be the case that the reader does not 
regard this topic as an issue. The fact is, nevertheless, that only theoretical arguments can 
underpin why all types of productivity-enhancing investments would increase due to more 
secure formal land rights under land scarcity. Studies should hence endeavor to rule out that 
the rejection or non-rejection of this hypothesis varies across productivity-enhancing 
investment types. In Table 1, several studies can be regarded as following this 
recommendation. Johnson (1998) and Twerefou et al (2011) explicitly focus on the impact of 
more secure formal land rights on irrigation. Roth et al (1994) make a distinction between the 
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effects on various types of productivity-enhancing investments, including bunding and 
leveling. Holden et al (2009) separates the effect on soil conservation, on the maintenance or 
improvement of soil conservation structures, and on trees. Jacoby & Minten (2005) 
disentangle the effects on irrigation, protective bunds, and land leveling. Additionally, one of 
the most impressive studies with regards to distinguishing investment types is the study 
conducted by Li et al (2000) that disentangles the effects on inter alia the usage of organic 
fertilizer, phosphate fertilizers, nitrogen fertilizers, and draft animal services. Nonetheless, in 
spite of these latter studies, there appears to be little continuity in the investment types that 
have been chosen in the studies in Table 1 as the investment types tend to vary across the 
studies. In short should studies therefore both disentangle the effects on various types of 
productivity-enhancing investments, as well as using a broader set of investment types since 
that would increase the possibility of comparison between studies, and possibly rule out that 
the hypothesis in the theory part of this thesis needs to be revised with regards to different 
types of productivity-enhancing investments. 
 
The sixth issue involves the measurement of agricultural productivity. The naïve analysis 
being conducted above masks that agricultural productivity may be defined in different ways. 
In the studies in Table 1, two definitions have been used. According to the first of these 
definitions, agricultural productivity is measured as the volume of agricultural output per land 
area. Most of the studies in Table 1 have calculated agricultural productivity by dint of this 
definition, thereby letting the calculated results constitute the dependent variable in the 
undertaken estimation procedures (Bellemare, 2013; Smith, 2004; Migot-Adholla et al, 1991; 
Moor & Nieuwoudt, 1998; Carter et al, 1989; Zikhali, 2008; van den Broeck et al, 2007; 
Holden et al, 2009; Li et al, 2000; Dlamini & Masuku, 2011; Feder et al, 1988). According 
the second definition, agricultural productivity is calculated as the value of agricultural output 
per land area. In contrast to the case regarding the first definition, only two studies have 
utilized measures being similar to the second definition when measuring agricultural 
productivity, namely the studies by Do & Iyer (2008) and Jacoby & Minten (2005), and it 
might be argued that the second definition is better than the first. Assuming that a context is 
characterized by land scarcity, more secure formal land rights should lead to that agricultural 
productivity increases by dint of the investment-demand, transactions, and credit-supply 
effects referred to above. Still, there is a possibility that farmers experience an agricultural 
productivity increase in terms of the volume of agricultural output, but not in terms of the 
value, thereby not leaving farmers better off. This argument has striking implications, 
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especially when considering the issue concerning the types of productivity-enhancing 
investments referred to above. That the value of agricultural output does not increase when 
formal land rights become more secure, in spite of that the volume increases, might stem from 
that farmers have undertaken inadequate types of productivity-enhancing investments; some 
types of productivity-enhancing investments may lead to an increased volume and value of 
agricultural output, whereas other investment types may only lead to an increased volume. 
Nonetheless, a comparison between agricultural productivity measures cannot be made unless 
both definitions are used. It might also be argued that agricultural productivity could be 
defined in terms of labor productivity since that would capture the marginal productivity of 
each farmer, and thereby reflect the value of work that each farmer undertakes. Still, this 
definition has not been used in any of the studies in Table 1. By these means, the thesis 
recommends the usage of multiple definitions of agricultural productivity. The reason is that, 
when comparing the estimation results when using multiple definitions, it is possible to draw 
conclusions regarding the adequacy of the productivity-enhancing investments undertaken by 
farmers in particular contexts, further calling for that land rights reforms may have to include 
an agricultural technology package provided to farmers so as to assure that they will be better 
off. This argument is also important in the sense that the main goal of land right reforms is to 
reduce poverty, whereby this goal would be unattained if the volume, and not the value, of 
agricultural output per land area would increase. In brief, since land might be sufficiently 
scarce for more secure formal land rights to increase agricultural productivity in terms of 
volume, additional definitions of agricultural productivity than the one pertaining to the 
volume should be used so as to provide deeper insights, especially regarding whether land 
rights reforms also should constitute an agricultural technology package that could ensure that 
farmers reap the benefits of their productivity-enhancing investments, i.e. also the value of 
their production increases. 
 
There is also a seventh issue; an issue relating to the measurement of formal land rights 
security. As earlier argued, a proof of land ownership often involves that a farmer disposes of 
a title. The disposal of a title should grant the farmer the rights referred to in the theory part of 
this thesis – i.e. using, alteration, profit, selling and exclusion rights – as well as the 
enforcement of these rights. Commonly, however, not all farmers dispose of titles, meaning 
that farmers disposing of titles are likely to benefit from more secure formal land rights than 
farmers without titles. Since the disposal of a title thereby can be considered as a proxy for the 
afore-mentioned rights and their enforcement, the majority of the studies in Table 1 have 
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made use of a title dummy as a measure for formal land rights security, in which the dummy 
variable typically takes the value of 1 if the farmer possesses a title, and the value of 0 if 
otherwise. This approach may be regarded as very convenient as it only requires the 
measurement of one single variable so as to arrive at conclusions concerning whether more 
secure formal land rights have a positive effect on agricultural productivity. Yet, as noted by 
several authors, the convenience of the title dummy also comes at a considerable price. By 
drawing on Herbst (2000) and Fafchamps & Minten (2001), Bellemare (2013: 272-273) 
argues that “[i]n several countries, a land title is often worth no more than the paper it is 
printed on, either because the state has failed to broadcast its power to remote rural areas ... or 
because the transaction costs involved in defending one’s claim to a plot of land through the 
legal system are prohibitively high.” What this statement implies is that a title may not have 
any practical value since the enforcement costs associated with a title are too high. Moor & 
Nieuwoudt (1998: 611) refers to Roth et al (1994) and Carter et al (1989) to further reinforce 
this point by arguing that “evidence from titling program[s] in Africa suggest that title 
registration is not necessarily synonymous with [land rights] security” as well as by stating 
that “if the formal land code is ambiguous in its definition of rights, and if legal procedures to 
settle disputes are vague, [farmers] may not perceive an increase in [land rights] security 
following registration of title.” Additionally, West & Myers (1992: 2) argue that “[t]itling 
may help farmers to acquire commercial credit ... but is useless where title is not acceptable as 
collateral.” As all of these arguments disapprove of the usage of a title dummy as a proxy for 
formal land rights security, better proxies need to be utilized. Some of the studies in Table 1 
have sought to make use of such proxies. Alston et al (1996) attempt to use the transferability, 
i.e. selling rights, as a proxy for formal land rights security. Nonetheless, since also Alston et 
al (1996) use the possession of a title as a proxy, the study does in fact proxy all of the other 
rights at the same time. The implication is thus that the usage of title as a proxy cannot only 
be regarded as inappropriate per se, but it also obscures the effect of various types of rights on 
agricultural productivity. This argument is also important due to the possibility that not all 
types of rights may be formal, but some rights in the land rights bundle might be informal, 
whereby this issue also is obscured when using title as a proxy; the reason being that the title 
may not cover all types of rights in the land rights bundle. Hence should studies, as also 
argued in the context of investments above, seek to disentangle the effects of various types of 
rights – as well as their enforcement – on agricultural productivity so as to rule out a revision 
of the hypothesis that all types of rights are conducive to productivity-enhancing investments 
under the condition that land is relatively scarce. One step in the right direction in this regard 
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is the study by Twerefou et al (2011) that only addresses the type of land rights that in this 
thesis have been denominated as selling rights. Still, some studies take this argument even 
further by analyzing the perceptions of formal land rights as well as by decomposing these 
rights into its individual components. With regards to perceived land rights, Dercon & 
Ayalew (2007: 10) highlight that “when researching the consequences of particular land rights 
in terms of investment and efficiency, it is perceived rights that will govern behavi[o]r.” As 
also implicitly noted by Bellemare (2013) above, a farmer needs to be aware of that his or her 
security of formal land rights has changed, because otherwise, investment incentives are 
unlikely to alter, whereby analyses of perceived formal land rights security are more 
appropriate than analyzing de jure formal land rights (Dercon & Krishnan, 2010). Six studies 
in Table 1 have therefore been devoted to analyze perceived formal land rights security by 
explicitly asking farmers about their perceptions. Deininger & Jin (2006) utilize two measures 
of perceived formal land rights security by proxying for perceived risk of land redistribution – 
thereby proxying for enforcement – as well as for the perceived ability of households to 
mortgage or sell land, hence proxying for selling rights. Resembling measurements of 
perceived formal land rights security have been carried out in the studies by Li et al (2000), 
Hagos (2012), and Pender et al (2006). Furthermore, Moor & Nieuwoudt (1998) use a 
particularly broad definition of formal land rights security by including the breadth, duration 
and assurance of rights; the breadth includes exclusion, use and transfer rights, the duration 
refers to the length of time for which the three rights are valid, while the assurance “defines 
the degree of certainty with which legal definitions of breadth and duration are held” (Moor & 
Nieuwoudt, 1998: 612; referring to Place et al [1994: 20]). However, since the breadth, 
duration and assurance later are weighted into a single index, the study does not explore the 
effects of various types of rights on agricultural productivity. Similarly is the case in the study 
by Roth et al (1994). Nonetheless does the study by Roth et al (1994) make use of a five-point 
scale when measuring perceived formal land rights security, implying that the study utilizes a 
consistent device to capture the perceptions of farmers. Since farmers’ perceptions hence are 
expected to vary despite that de jure formal land rights may be invariant across households in 
a certain context, the problem that earlier was mentioned in reference to the variation in the 
security of formal land rights between households also is expected to disappear, thereby not 
causing parameter estimates to be downward biased. In other words are studies subsequently 
more likely to draw reliable conclusions regarding the effect of formal land rights security on 
agricultural productivity. Thus, so as to maximize the possibility of comparison between 
studies, studies should address the issue concerning how formal land rights security is 
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measured in two ways. Firstly, studies should utilize a consistent device – e.g. a five-point 
scale – so as to measure perceived rather than de jure formal land rights security. Secondly, 
studies should seek to disentangle the effects of various types of rights on agricultural 
productivity. 
 
An eighth issue – also being the last – involves the measurement capturing factor 
endowments. In the naïve analysis above, an attempt was made to construct a measure 
capturing factor endowments by calculating the population density pertaining to agriculture. 
This measure did not only exhibit the drawback of including temporary meadows for mowing 
and pastures, and land temporarily in fallow, but the figures generated for the studies in Table 
1 did not adequately represent the study areas for which the studies accounted. In order to 
expect an adequate representation of population densities in the study areas, data on 
agricultural population densities in each of the studies would be required. Yet, such data is not 
readily available. A problem that further complicates the analysis is that the studies in Table 1 
have been extremely vague about the concept of population density. Only two of the studies 
make any reference with regards to the relative scarcity or abundance of land. Pender et al 
(2006: 170-171) highlight that their “study region included most of Uganda, including more 
densely populated and more secure areas in the southwest, central, eastern, and parts of 
northern Uganda.” Yet, this comment does not provide much information for a reader since 
the study does not construct relevant sub-samples. Put differently, the study does not break 
down its estimation procedure into densely and less densely populated areas. Also, in the 
study analyzing Rwanda, Ghana and Kenya, Migot-Adholla et al (1991: 160) state that 
“Ghana was chosen to represent a situation of relative land abundance, whereas Rwanda 
represents a case of [relative] land scarcity.” Furthermore, the study by Besley (1995: 913) 
that was referred to earlier highlights in the study of two Ghanaian regions that “[t]he 
population density in [Anloga] is much higher than in Wassa.” These two latter studies 
thereby clarify to a greater extent what might be expected in terms of findings since 
references are made to factor endowments. In spite of these clarifications, however, the weak 
attempts to address the measurement of factor endowments lead this thesis to ask what kind of 
population density to which earlier studies have been referring. The studies might refer to the 
population density in their study areas as a whole, or to the population density that solely 
pertains to agriculture. Nevertheless, since no indications are provided with regards to what is 
meant by population density, it becomes difficult to state anything particular about whether 
factor endowments are explanatory. Hence, to combat this issue, the thesis suggests that a 
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resembling methodology as recommended with regards to the measurement of formal land 
rights security is required, namely by using a consistent device – e.g. a five-point scale – to 
capture farmers’ perceptions of factor endowments. As argued above, it is the perceived 
security of formal land rights that governs a farmer’s behavior, i.e. his or her incentive to 
invest. Likewise could be argued about factor endowments. Farmers perceiving land to be 
scarce (abundant) are likely to have more (fewer) incentives to undertake productivity-
enhancing investments, because in light of the afore-mentioned argument concerning 
perceived formal land rights security, it might be contended that incentives tend not to be 
formed by how the world in reality looks, but rather by how the world is perceived. Moreover, 
the usage of a consistent device makes it possible to break down samples into relevant sub-
samples ranging from the households with the most land scarce perceptions to the most land 
abundant perceptions. Thereby could the usage of for instance a five-point scale as a 
consistent device result in that five sub-samples are constructed, from which reasonable 
conclusions not only could be drawn with regards to the relationship between formal land 
rights security and agricultural productivity, but also with regards to the explanatory power of 
factor endowments. Due to these reasons, this thesis argues that the usage of a consistent 
device is one of the most appropriate manners in which factor endowments can be taken 
consideration in land rights studies, because even though that a consistent device might not 
imply full comparability between studies, it could at least offer insights regarding whether 
factor endowments constitute an explanation, and thereby also provide useful conclusions 
regarding the adequacy of land rights reforms in particular contexts. 
 
In sum, all of the eight issues that this section highlights need to be properly addressed so as 
to enable useful inferences regarding whether factor endowments can explain the divergent 
findings of the studies in Table 1. Firstly, studies should not endeavor to use nationally 
representative samples as there is evidence of heterogenous effects stemming from more 
secure formal land rights; an alteration in formal land rights security affect households 
differently within countries. Secondly, endogeneity must be addressed; by using instrumental 
variables regressions, by carefully choosing an appropriate sample, and/or by using 
regressions adjusting for unobservable fixed effects. Otherwise, the estimated effect of more 
secure formal land rights on agricultural productivity may be biased, potentially leading to the 
conclusion that formal land rights security is conducive to productivity-enhancing 
investments, and hence increased agricultural productivity, when it is not and vice versa. 
Thirdly, investment-demand, transactions, and credit-supply mechanisms need to be 
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disentangled. A reason is that farmers that demand more productivity-enhancing investments 
as a result of more secure formal land rights may not possess the required capital to undertake 
such investments, whereby a functioning credit market need to supply the demanded amount 
of credit to farmers. Another reason is that leasing markets may be imperfect, meaning that 
farmers to a great extent are unable to lease and/or lease out land plots. These issues have two 
important implications. The first implication is that the factor endowments explanation – if it 
in the future would be indicated to hold – needs to account for whether farmers have readily 
access credit as well as if farmers are able to lease and/or lease out land plots. The second 
implication is that land rights reforms also might have to be accompanied by a creation or 
stimulation of credit and leasing markets. Fourthly, both of the effects stemming from more 
secure formal land rights, i.e. on productivity-enhancing investments and agricultural 
productivity, should be studied since evidence has indicated that investments that typically are 
associated with increased productivity do not necessarily induce an agricultural productivity 
increase. Therefore, the whole relationship, running from more secure formal land rights to 
productivity-enhancing investments, and in turn to agricultural productivity, should to be 
considered. Fifthly, studies should seek to disentangle the effects of more secure formal land 
rights on different types of productivity-enhancing investments, as well as endeavor to utilize 
a broader set of investment types. The argument for addressing this issue is that it could rule 
out that the hypothesis concerning the relationship between formal land rights security and 
productivity-enhancing investments, and thereby agricultural productivity, needs to be 
revised. Sixthly, multiple definitions should be used when measuring agricultural 
productivity. Sufficient relative scarcity of land is hypothesized to make formal land rights 
security conducive to agricultural productivity. However, as the agricultural productivity only 
in terms of volume may increase, multiple definitions of agricultural productivity ought to be 
used; more than one measure can provide insights regarding whether land rights reforms also 
should constitute an agricultural technology package that could ensure that farmers reap the 
economic benefits of their productivity-enhancing investments. Seventhly, studies should 
attempt to address the measurement of formal land rights security in two ways; firstly by 
disentangling the effects of various types of rights on agricultural productivity, owing to the 
same reason as in the fifth issue, and secondly by making use of perceived rather than de jure 
formal land rights security through using a consistent device as it is perceived land rights that 
govern behavior. Lastly, the thesis suggests that a consistent device also should be used for 
the measurement of factor endowments due to that perceived, and not actual, factor 
endowments might be influencing a farmer’s investment decisions.  
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Since none of the studies have addressed all of the eight issues, thereby also obstructing the 
comparability between the studies in Table 1, clear conclusions cannot be drawn with regards 
to the explanatory power of factor endowments. In reference to the above-mentioned issues, 
however, the thesis argues that a factor endowments explanation at least should be 
accompanied by considering the existence of credit and leasing markets as well as by taking 
into account the adequacy of agricultural technologies in particular contexts, because as 
argued earlier, these three factors could potentially constitute important considerations for 
future land rights reforms. 
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4. Conclusion 
This thesis began by arguing that studies that have evaluated the relationship between formal 
land rights security and agricultural productivity have arrived at divergent findings, as well as 
that factor endowments possibly could bridge the gap between these findings. The ensuing 
section of the thesis then theorized about the above-mentioned relationship by putting the land 
rights debate into the context of new institutional economics, more precisely into 
Williamson’s (1994, 2000) multi-level model of economic systems. This part of the thesis 
contended that both the institutional environment and the embeddedness of institutions need 
to be considered when addressing land rights institutions together with factor endowments. 
Afterwards, in the empirical analysis, the thesis first carried out a naïve analysis by comparing 
the findings of 24 studies, whereby factor endowments were disconfirmed as an explanation. 
It was later argued, however, that the naïve analysis could be rejected altogether, and that in 
order to draw useful conclusions with regards to the relevant relationship, eight issues needed 
to be addressed with the following measures: 
 
1. Representativeness of samples: Micro rather than macro approaches should be used. 
2. Endogeneity: By utilizing instrumental variables regressions, carefully choosing an 
appropriate sample, and/or regressions adjusting for unobservable fixed effects. 
3. Investment-demand, transactions, and credit-supply mechanisms: Need to be 
disentangled in estimation procedures. 
4. The effect of more secure formal land rights: Effects on both productivity-enhancing 
investments and agricultural productivity should be included. 
5. Productivity-enhancing investments types: A broader set of investment types should 
be used, and investment types need to be distinguished in estimation procedures. 
6. Defining agricultural productivity: Multiple definitions should be used, including the 
volume and the value of agricultural output per land area etc. 
7. Proxying for formal land rights security: Data on the perceptions of formal land rights 
security should be collected by using a consistent device, and the effect of various 
types of perceived rights should be distinguished in estimation procedures. 
8. Measuring factor endowments: Data on the perceptions of factor endowments, i.e. 
relative land abundance or scarcity, should be collected by dint of a consistent device, 
and thereafter should samples be divided into sub-samples in accordance to these 
perceptions. 
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Thus, addressing the research question in light of the above-mentioned issues, the only answer 
that the thesis can provide in terms of factor endowments’ explanatory power is that factor 
endowments possibly could explain the divergent findings, yet not alone. As this thesis 
demonstrates, drawing useful conclusions with regards to factor endowments is a perplexing 
task provided the various drawbacks that obstruct the comparability of earlier studies. In other 
words, the thesis argues that the relationship between formal land rights security and 
agricultural productivity – when accounting for factor endowments – still is a rather unclear, 
and that studies therefore ought to address this topic more rigorously. Nevertheless, in order 
to account for the relationship running from formal land rights security to agricultural 
productivity, there are at least three other topics than factor endowments that deserve 
consideration. Firstly, the existence of credit markets should be analyzed since the credit-
supply effect otherwise may not be realized owing to that farmers may not possess the capital 
to undertake productivity-enhancing investments themselves. Secondly, for the transactions 
effect to be realized, the presence of leasing markets is key or else the transfer of land from 
less to more productive farmers may be impeded. Lastly, whether the value, and therefore not 
only the volume, of agricultural output per land area increases owing to more secure formal 
land rights needs to be taken into account, because that could provide useful indications of the 
appropriateness of agricultural technologies utilized and invested in by farmers. 
 
Moreover, due to the drawbacks of earlier studies, it also becomes difficult to draw useful 
conclusions considering the nature of future land rights reforms. Yet, this argument does not 
rule out that the thesis can make an educated speculation. According to what the thesis earlier 
has argued, it may be inferred that there are at least four possible factors about which policy-
makers should think carefully; that is if land rights reforms should be considered at all. 
Firstly, land rights reforms should not be designed in a way that brings about uniform changes 
in land rights institutions across a country since there are indications of heterogenous effects 
stemming from such reforms. In layman’s terms, all farmers across a country are not expected 
to alter their behavior identically as a result of more secure formal land rights. For this reason, 
within-country variation should be considered when designing land rights reforms. Secondly, 
land rights reforms may have to be accompanied by the creation or stimulation of credit 
markets in order to assure that farmers readily can access required capital to undertake 
productivity-enhancing investments. Thirdly, leasing markets might constitute an important 
consideration for land rights reforms since more productive farmers would be more enabled to 
get access to land when leasing markets are less imperfect. As such a consideration not only 
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could lead to that agricultural productivity on average increases, but also might imply that the 
more productive farmers raise their consumption, multiplier effects could be set off within a 
country’s economy, potentially raising the economic welfare of a whole country’s inhabitants. 
Lastly, an agricultural technology package may have to be included in land rights reforms, 
since in certain contexts, it might prove that certain types of productivity-enhancing 
investments only may raise the volume, but not the value, of agricultural output per land area. 
 
The debate on land rights reforms has been ongoing for more than two decades, and it is, 
indeed, with great concern this thesis concludes that it yet is unclear whether factor 
endowments can explain the divergent findings with regards to formal land rights security and 
agricultural productivity; particularly when considering that the economic welfare of poor 
households in developing countries may depend on the conclusions drawn in land rights 
studies. This thesis does, however, provide insights that possibly could bring an end to this 
debate; that is by pointing to the above-mentioned issues. It would, of course, be rash to 
presume that a one-dimensional explanation such as factor endowments could explain why 
land rights reforms are likely to fail in land abundant contexts, especially since this thesis 
contends that a factor endowments explanation at least should be accompanied by considering 
the existence of credit and leasing markets, as well as by taking into account the adequacy of 
utilized agricultural technologies in particular contexts. Furthermore, even though the thesis 
arrives at findings that contribute to useful insights, which in turn have the possibility to 
improve policy-making with regards to land rights, the findings in this thesis may in the end 
not be applicable to all countries. In some countries, agriculture might constitute a negligible 
part of their respective gross domestic products, for instance due to that the countries have 
attained a high gross domestic product per capita. This argument, in turn, implies that some 
countries already could have moved beyond an agriculture-based economy as a result of 
structural transformation. Subsequently may the land rights debate not be of relevance to 
these countries, because land right reforms in such countries are likely to not be very cost-
effective. Additionally, other institutional arrangements than the ones governing land rights 
may matter for land use, and hence also for agricultural productivity. What these institutional 
arrangements entail is, however, outside the scope of this study. Consequently ought the 
afore-mentioned topics to constitute important issues that future research also should aim to 
investigate further. Nonetheless, as land over time is becoming more and more relatively 
scarce, it is the hope of this thesis that factor endowments in the future at least could provide 
some guidance for policy-makers in the combat against poverty. 
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